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FRIEDRICHS AND THE MOVE TOWARD PRIVATE
ORDERING OF WAGES AND BENEFITS
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
MARIA O’BRIEN HYLTON*
***
In its recent Harris v. Quinn opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court (in
particular Justice Alito) seemed to welcome a future opportunity to
reconsider the 1977 landmark Abood decision in which public sector closed
shop employees were not required to join a union but could be subject to fees
that cover the costs of “collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment purposes.” Supporters of the Abood approach argue
that it is a reasonable compromise that prevents non-members from free
riding on the union’s efforts (i.e. enjoying the wages and benefits negotiated
by the union without sharing the costs incurred). Detractors and the
plaintiffs in Friedrichs argue that free riding concerns are insufficient to
overcome serious First Amendment objections. The central idea is that all
bargaining in the public sector is inherently political. Public sector pays,
tenure and benefits (especially expensive retiree health care and pension
promises), it is claimed, now profoundly affect the ability of state and local
governments to function in many jurisdictions. This article briefly reviews
the major claim in Friedrichs—that public sector agency agreements violate
the First Amendment--and considers the implications of a decision that, but
for Justice Scalia’s unexpected death almost certainly would have
overturned Abood. What would this mean for financially strapped state and
local governments? To understand what a victory for the Friedrichs
plaintiffs would mean, this paper looks at recent data from Wisconsin which
dramatically constrained public sector agency agreements a few years ago
and has seen public union membership, union revenue and political power
plunge as a result. If Friedrichs had overturned Abood during the 2016
term, we would now expect to see national patterns similar to those observed
in Wisconsin. In many places around the country a drop in public sector
*I
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union political power would be expected to translate into a climate more
supportive of reduced future expenditures on public pensions and health
care.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, conventional wisdom suggested that the petitioners
in the Friedrichs1 case were likely to prevail on their core claim that payment
of agency fees to a public sector union (in this case the California Teachers
Association) violated non-union members’ First Amendment rights by
forcing them to subsidize political speech with which they disagree.2 The
The petitioners first filed their suit to end mandatory union dues on April 29,
2013. The case was decided rather fast by the district court on December 5, 2013
because the petitioners requested judgment be entered for the defendant unions.
Though the move seems odd, the petitioners believed their case brought up a unique
legal issue and that only the Supreme Court possessed the authority to grant the relief
they requested. Upon immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the petitioners again
requested judgment for the defendants, and, on November 18, 2014, the Ninth
Circuit granted a Summary Affirmance of the district court. Friedrichs and her coplaintiffs filed for certiorari on January 26, 2015, and the Supreme Court granted
cert on June 30, 2015. The case was argued on Jan. 11, 2016 before a full Supreme
Court; however, the sudden death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia on February
13, 2016 left only eight justices to decide the case. Justice Scalia, “who hinted
strongly during oral arguments in January that he considered mandatory dues
unconstitutional, would have likely been a deciding vote.” However, on March 29,
2016, the Supreme Court issued a Per Curiam, one-line opinion: “The judgment is
affirmed by an equally divided Court.” The death of Scalia certainly led to the
divided opinion, as the late justice was an all but official fifth vote for the petitioners,
and allowed the unions to continue to collect mandatory union dues. Though the
plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing on April 8, 2016, the still short-handed Supreme
Court denied the petition on June 28, 2016, leaving the unions the freedom to collect
mandatory dues for the foreseeable future. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc.,
578 U. S. ____ (2016); Haley Sweetland Edwards, How Antonin Scalia’s Death Will
Help Teachers’ Unions, TIME (Feb. 16, 2016); Freidrichs v CTA: Case Timeline,
THE CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. (July 16, 2016), https://www.cirusa.org/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association-et-al/friedrichs-v-ctatimeline/.
2
Justice Alito’s opinions in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000 and in Harris v. Quinn
make clear his view that Abood was wrongly decided and that agency fee
arrangements by non-members amount to state-coerced speech, which cannot
withstand the strict scrutiny required under the First Amendment.
1
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Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification for
compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents
something of an anomaly--one that we have found to be justified
by the interest in furthering “labor peace” [citation omitted]. But
it is an anomaly nonetheless. Similarly, requiring objecting
nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of
union dues--as opposed to exempting them from making such
payments unless they opt in--represents a remarkable boon for
unions. Courts “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.” [citation omitted] Once it is recognized, as
our cases have, that a nonmember cannot be forced to fund a
union's political or ideological activities, what is the justification
for putting the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making
such a payment? Shouldn't the default rule comport with the
probable preferences of most nonmembers? And isn't it likely that
most employees who choose not to join the union that represents
their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full amount of union
dues? An opt-out system creates a risk that the fees paid by
nonmembers will be used to further political and ideological ends
with which they do not agree. But a “[u]nion should not be
permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first
establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds
will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining.
Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012).
In upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois law, the Seventh
Circuit relied on this Court’s decision in Abood supra, which held
that state employees who choose not to join a public-sector union
may nevertheless be compelled to pay an agency fee to support
union work that is related to the collective-bargaining process.
[citation omitted] Two Terms ago, in Knox [citation omitted], we
pointed out that Abood is “something of an anomaly.” [citation
omitted] “‘The primary purpose’ of permitting unions to collect
fees from nonmembers,” we noted, “is ‘to prevent nonmembers
from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the employment
benefits obtained by the union’s collective bargaining without
sharing the costs incurred.’” [citations omitted] But “[s]uch freerider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections.” [citation omitted] For this reason, Abood
stands out, but the State of Illinois now asks us to sanction what
amounts to a very significant expansion of Abood—so that it
applies, not just to full-fledged public employees, but also to
others who are deemed to be public employees solely for the
purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee.
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Supreme Court, following oral argument on January 11, 2016, seemed
poised to undo the decades-old compromise embodied in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,3 which allowed non-members to pay an amount less
than the full membership fee but sufficient to cover the costs of “collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes.”4
The startling death of Justice Scalia deprived the Court of the fifth vote

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2014).
3
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235-6 (1977) (holding that the
Constitution allows public sector unions to “spend funds for the expression of
political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other
ideological views,” but restricting these expenditures to employees who do not
object to those ideas and were not “coerced” into joining the union by threat of the
loss of their position); See also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 448-56 (1984)
(holding that public unions could use funds from objecting members forced into
union contributions to pay for union conventions, publications, and “de minimus”
social activities, but not for organizing costs or litigation that is not “directly
concerned” with the union and its bargaining function); see also Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986) (holding that “the constitutional
requirements for [a] [u]nion’s collection of agency fees include an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge
the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the
amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending”); see also Knox,
132 S. Ct. at 2295-6 (stating that public sector unions have a right to express political
and social views “without government interference,” but dissenters who chose not
to join the union and are required to pay dues have the same right; thus, the Court
held, “when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the
union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from
nonmembers without their affirmative consent”); see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2636,
2638 (limiting “Abood’s reach to full-fledged state employees” and refusing to
extend it to semi-public employees when the union does not have “the full scope of
powers and duties generally available under American Labor law.”).
4
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
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needed to overturn Abood.5 The Court issued a 4-4 split decision on March
29, 2016, which means Abood lives on—at least for a while.6
5
On March 29, 2016, Adam Liptak of The New York Times called the
Friedrichs decision “the starkest illustration yet of how the sudden death of Antonin
Scalia last month has blocked the power of the court’s four remaining conservatives
to move the law to the right.” Adam Liptak, Victory for Unions as Supreme Court,
Scalia Gone, Ties 4-4, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2016 (“the starkest illustration yet of
how the sudden death of Antonin Scalia last month has blocked the power of the
court’s four remaining conservatives to move the law to the right). However, Liptak
went further, explaining the broader effects of Scalia’s death on the Court: “His
death changed the balance of power in this case, and most likely in many others. The
clout of the court’s four-member liberal wing has increased significantly. Its
members — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor
and Elena Kagan — can create deadlocks, as they did Tuesday, and they can
sometimes attract the vote of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy for a liberal result.” Id.
6
See Daniel Hamel & David Louk, Much Abood About Nothing?, WHATEVER
SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/much-abood-about-nothing-447dbe2758eb#.hd1dp0tcc. Hamel and Louk
lay out the significance of allowing Abood to live on, but suggest there may be an
alternative for Abood’s “agency shops” in a so-called “direct payment alternative.”
Id. However, they recognize that this alternative would not be feasible in states with
a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor, where Abood is all that allows
unions the power to collect from unwilling participants.
Laws in almost half of U.S. states allow unions and public sector
employers to set up so-called “agency shops.” Employees in an
agency shop need not join their local union, but the workers who
opt not to join the union still must pay a “fair-share” or “agency”
fee to cover their pro rata portion of the union’s collective
bargaining costs. Starting with the 1977 case Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, the Supreme Court has said that agency shop
arrangements do not violate the First Amendment rights of public
sector employees. The primary question in today’s case,
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, was whether
Abood remains good law. For now, it does. Today’s 4–4 split
means that the lower court’s decision in Friedrichs is affirmed, and
the lower court (the Ninth Circuit) abided by Abood. So agency
shops can continue to exist in the 20-odd states that allow them. .
. . To be sure, there are some agency shop states in which Abood’s
fate matters significantly for public sector unions. Prime examples
include Illinois and New Jersey — states with Democratic
majorities in the legislature but Republicans in the governor’s
mansion. If agency shop laws had been struck down and the
legislatures in those states had passed bills to implement the direct
payment alternative, we think it quite likely that the governors in
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This less-than-total membership cost is either a constitutionally
impermissible compulsory payment or a reasonable compromise that has
served both labor and public sector employers’ interests well for many years.
At oral argument it certainly appeared there were five votes in favor of the
former position and, as one commentator noted, “Abood is in plenty of
trouble.”7
This paper is not about the merits of the arguments made in
Freidrichs nor does it offer a theory of the First Amendment or of collective
bargaining in the public sector. There exists a substantial body of work,
which attempts to do one or more of these things.8 This paper examines the

Id.

those states (Bruce Rauner and Chris Christie, respectively) would
have exercised their veto power. In states like Hawaii and
California, by contrast, the demise of Abood likely would have led
Democratic lawmakers to pass — and the Democratic governor to
sign — legislation implementing the direct payment alternative.

7
Lee H. Adler, Free Speech, Free Riders and the Fate of the Union Agency Fee,
27 DLR I-1, Feb. 11, 2016.
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Friedrichs after its recent decisions in Knox and Harris means that
Abood is in plenty of trouble. The longstanding consensus, which
balances an actual but modest infringement on nonmembers'
association and speech rights with a union's need to pay for the
services it renders to all in a bargaining unit, is in question. . . .
th[is] new jurisprudence reflects an active change of focus toward
“individual” rights that has an effect of undermining the ability of
public employees to accomplish collective objectives. Collective
bargaining and union representation require a funding source, and
that source must be the employees who receive the benefits of
union representation. But Knox and Harris and the petitioners in
Friedrichs would make raising those funds as difficult as possible,
even when state governments believe it is in their own best
interests. This indifference towards state's rights, the distaste
shown by Justice Alito and the Friedrichs petitioners towards the
compromise thinking in Abood, and the apparent rush of the Court
to consider altering the careful First Amendment balance still alive
in Locke suggest an exaltation of individual rights over the
common weal that is not particularly well-explained.
Id.
8
See Jake Wasserman, Gutting Public Sector Unions: Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 229 (2016)
(discussing a potential constitutional challenge public-sector unions would face in
Friedrichs that might “lead to their demise;” further discussing the potential for
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expected effects of a decision, which was on the verge of overturning Abood,
and, in particular, the effect of such a change on public sector employee
benefits costs and total budgets.
Using data from Wisconsin following that state’s enactment of Act
10 (the 2011 Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill),9 which largely eliminated
collective bargaining for state public employees, I trace the effects on
membership in Wisconsin’s largest teacher union and on it lobbying efforts
and membership levels. Act 10 has been nothing short of catastrophic for
Wisconsin’s public sector unions.10 There is every reason to believe that the
Friedrichs to “have a broad impact on public-sector unions’ financial health and
political clout, as well as politics more broadly,” should Abood have been
overruled.); Id. at 236-237 (noting that the constitutional arguments Friedrichs
advanced in her brief were not complicated, calling Abood a constitutionally
indefensible compromise, a “jurisprudential outlier,” and irreconcilable with [the
Supreme] Court’s decision in every related First Amendment context,” further
rejecting the notions that employees who opt out of unions are “free-riding” and that
this issue is compelling enough to “withstand exacting scrutiny. Id at 234-36.
However, the union’s arguments were even simpler, noting that stare decisis should
result in Abood being reaffirmed because it “correctly reflects” the state’s interest in
managing labor relations and that the employee’s 1 st Amendment “interests against
compelled agency fees are ‘certainly not stronger than the interest in affirmative
expression.’”). Id. at 237 (noting, the unions “point[ed] out that ‘strong reliance
interests have developed around the agency-shop model,’ and note outlawing
agency-shop agreements would ‘overrule the judgments of 23 States plus the District
of Columbia’ . . . [and] tens of thousands of collective-bargaining agreements
governing public employees would be thrown into disarray.”).
9
Assemb. B. 11, 2011-2012 Legis. Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011).
10
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2014.
Three years ago, a labor leader named Marty Beil was one of the
loudest opponents of Gov. Scott Walker’s “budget repair bill,” a
proposal that brought tens of thousands of protesters out to the
Wisconsin State Capitol in Madison in frigid February weather. A
gruff-voiced grizzly of a man, Mr. Beil warned that the bill was
rigged with booby traps that would cripple the state’s publicsector unions. He gets no satisfaction from being right. Since the
law was passed, membership in his union, which represents state
employees, has fallen 60 percent; its annual budget has plunged to
$2 million from $6 million. Mr. Walker’s landmark law — called
Act 10 — severely restricted the power of public-employee unions
to bargain collectively, and that provision, among others, has
given social workers, prison guards, nurses and other public
employees little reason to pay dues to a union that can no longer
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parties which organized and funded the Friedrichs litigation will try again
given Justice Alito’s near invitation to litigate the constitutionality of
Abood.11 One would expect that the re-try will take place fairly quickly in
the event the next Supreme Court appointee is viewed as sharing Scalia’s
views.12

Id.

do much for them. Members of Mr. Beil’s group, the Wisconsin
State Employees’ Union, complain that their take-home pay has
fallen more than 10 percent in recent years, a sign of the union’s
greatly diminished power. “It’s had a devastating effect on our
union,” Mr. Beil, its executive director, said of Act 10. He was
sitting in his Madison office, inside the headquarters that his
union, hard up for cash, may be forced to sell. The building is
underused anyway, as staff reductions have left many offices
empty.

In his harsh and unyielding opinion, Justice Alito criticized nearly every facet
of the Abood decision.
The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several grounds.
Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the
decision, but several have become more evident and troubling in
the years since then. The Abood Court seriously erred in treating
Hanson and Street as having all but decided the constitutionality
of compulsory payments to a public-sector union. As we have
explained, Street was not a constitutional decision at all, and
Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsupported
sentence that its author essentially abandoned a few years later.
Surely a First Amendment issue of this importance deserved better
treatment. . . Abood does not seem to have anticipated the
magnitude of the practical administrative problems that would
result in attempting to classify public-sector union expenditures as
either “chargeable” (in Abood’s terms, expenditures for
“collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievanceadjustment purposes,” (citation omitted) or nonchargeable (i.e.,
expenditures for political or ideological purposes, (citation
omitted). In the years since Abood, the Court has struggled
repeatedly with this issue (citations omitted).
. . . Finally, a
critical pillar of the Abood Court’s analysis rests on an
unsupported empirical assumption, namely, that the principle of
exclusive representation in the public sector is dependent on a
union or agency shop.
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632-2634.
12
See Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s Supreme Court Pick
Unprecendented, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016 (noting that The Republican Senate is
fighting hard to ensure that the next Justice on the Court shares Scalia’s view.
11
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It is for this reason that the conditions in Wisconsin post-Act 10
provide a near-perfect laboratory in which to examine what happens when
public sector unions can no longer compel even a modest level of support for
their activities from members and non-members. What can be observed in
Wisconsin is an astonishing drop in public sector union membership levels,
and lobbying activity (which I view as a reasonable proxy for political
strength). To the extent that public sector union strength accounts for the
level of spending on employee benefits—especially pensions and high cost
health insurance for active employees and retirees—we should expect to see
these costs come down over time in Wisconsin and in any other state that
outlaws agency fees. This means that strained state budgets could well be
the first beneficiaries of the movement to eliminate agency fees.13 This
move—toward private ordering of wages and benefits in the public sector
and away from the morally hazardous process that currently determines the
overall compensation of public employees14—will have a profound effect on
President Obama’s current nominee, Merrick Garland, has failed to even be given a
hearing in the Senate at the time this paper was written); Id. (“Senate Republicans
say they will not consider any nominee offered by Mr. Obama to replace Justice
Antonin Scalia, who died in February. The power to appoint Justice Scalia’s
successor, they say, should belong to the next president.”).
13
The MacIver Institute, a Wisconsin-based conservative think tank, suggests that
Act 10 has been remarkably successful in saving Wisconsin taxpayer dollars and
lowering the state funds spent on public sector pensions and benefits:
[Act 10] has saved Wisconsin taxpayers $5.24 billion, according
to a new analysis by the MacIver Institute. The analysis found that
Wisconsin saved $3.36 billion by requiring government
employees contribute a reasonable amount to their own
retirement. The analysis also estimates local units of governments
saved an additional $404.8 million total by taking common sense
steps like opening their employees' health insurance to
competitive bidding. Milwaukee Public Schools saved $1.3 billion
in long-term pension liabilities, and Neenah saved $97 million in
long-term pension liabilities in addition to other savings.
Brett Healy, Act 10 Saves Wisconsin Taxpayers More Than $5 Billion Over 5 Years,
MacIver Analysis Finds, MACIVER INST. (Feb. 11, 2016) http://www.maciver
institute.com/2016/02/act-10-saves-wisconsin-taxpayers-more-than-5-billion-over5-years-maciver-analysis-finds/.
14
Daniel Disalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFF. Fall
2010, at 3.
The very nature of many public services — such as policing
the streets and putting out fires — gives government a monopoly
or near monopoly; striking public employees could therefore hold
the public hostage. As long-time New York Times labor reporter
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public sector budgets and the ability of public unions to seeks rents that result
in wages and benefits that are relatively generous when compared with the
private sector. This process appears to be underway in Wisconsin. When
the issue in Friedrichs once again comes before the Court15 the experience
in Wisconsin should provide some guidance about what to expect on a
national scale.
II.

LESSONS FROM WISCONSIN AFTER ACT 10

To understand what a post-Friedrichs world might have looked like,
it helps to look back at the changes that have taken place in Wisconsin since
the passage of Act 10 in 2011. Also known as the Wisconsin Budget Repair
Bill, Act 10 was signed into law by then newly-elected Governor Scott
Walker.16 Act 10 largely eliminated collective bargaining for public
employees in the state except for law enforcement and fire protection
personnel.17 Act 10 expressly forbid general employees from bargaining
A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the
notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to
whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services."
“When it comes to advancing their interests, public-sector unions
have significant advantages over traditional unions. For one thing,
using the political process, they can exert far greater influence
over their members' employers — that is, government — than
private-sector unions can. Through their extensive political
activity, these government-workers' unions help elect the very
politicians who will act as "management" in their contract
negotiations — in effect handpicking those who will sit across the
bargaining table from them, in a way that workers in a private
corporation (like, say, American Airlines or the Washington Post
Company) cannot. Such power led Victor Gotbaum, the leader of
District Council 37 of the AFSCME in New York City, to brag in
1975: "We have the ability, in a sense, to elect our own boss.
Id. at 6-7, 10.
15
How fast this happens will be a function of the perceived political orientation
of Justice Scalia’s replacement.
16
Assemb. B. 11, 2011-2012 Legis. Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011).
17
See Martin H. Mail, The Legislative Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law:
A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) (noting
that when the bill was introduced “Senate Democrats fled to Illinois, denying the
super-majority quorum needed under state law to consider fiscal legislation. While
the Democrats were still out of the state, the Republicans stripped out provisions that
they believed required the super quorum and enacted the bill. The controversy
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collectively on issues other than base wages;18 prohibits municipal
employers from deducting labor organization dues from paychecks of
general employees;19 imposes annual recertification requirements20 and
produced public demonstrations on a scale Madison had not seen since the Vietnam
War. The Dane County Circuit Court enjoined the enactment on the ground that the
legislature violated the state’s open meeting laws, but in a party-line four to three
vote, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, and Act 10 took effect.”).
18
Wisc. Stat. § 111.70 (4) (mb),
Prohibited subjects of bargaining; general municipal
employees. The municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining
collectively with a collective bargaining unit containing a general
municipal employee with respect to any of the following: 1. Any
factor or condition of employment except wages, which includes
only total base wages and excludes any other compensation, which
includes, but is not limited to, overtime, premium pay, merit pay,
performance pay, supplemental compensation, pay schedules, and
automatic pay progressions.
Id.
19
Id at § 111.06 (1) (i).
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer individually or
in concert with others . . . [t]o deduct labor organization dues or
assessments from an employee's earnings, unless the employer has
been presented with an individual order therefore, signed by the
employee personally, and terminable by the employee giving to
the employer at least 30 days' written notice of the termination.
This paragraph applies to the extent permitted under federal law.
Id.
20
Id at § 111.83 (3) (b).
Annually, no later than December 1, the commission shall
conduct an election to certify the representative of a collective
bargaining unit that contains a general employee. There shall be
included on the ballot the names of all labor organizations having
an interest in representing the general employees participating in
the election. The commission may exclude from the ballot one
who, at the time of the election, stands deprived of his or her rights
under this subchapter by reason of a prior adjudication of his or
her having engaged in an unfair labor practice. The commission
shall certify any representative that receives at least 51 percent of
the votes of all of the general employees in the collective
bargaining unit. If no representative receives at least 51 percent of
the votes of all of the general employees in the collective
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement, the commission shall decertify the current
representative and the general employees shall be nonrepresented.
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disallows fair share agreements which require non-represented general
employees to make contributions to labor organizations.21
A.

THE STATE COURT CHALLENGE

In August 2011, unhappy with the new law, two Wisconsin unions—
the Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public Employees Local 6122 filed suit in
Wisconsin state court against Governor Walker.23 The unions alleged, inter

Id.

Id.

Notwithstanding s. 111.82, if a representative is decertified under
this paragraph, the affected general employees may not be
included in a substantially similar collective bargaining unit for 12
months from the date of decertification. The commission’s
certification of the results of any election is conclusive unless
reviewed as provided by s. 111.07 (8).
21

Id at § 111.85 (1) (a)-(b).
(a) No fair-share or maintenance of membership agreement
covering public safety employees may become effective unless
authorized by a referendum. The commission shall order a
referendum whenever it receives a petition supported by proof that
at least 30 percent of the public safety employees in a collective
bargaining unit desire that a fair-share or maintenance of
membership agreement be entered into between the employer and
a labor organization. A petition may specify that a referendum is
requested on a maintenance of membership agreement only, in
which case the ballot shall be limited to that question. (b) For a
fair-share agreement to be authorized, at least two-thirds of the
eligible public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote
in favor of the agreement. For a maintenance of membership
agreement to be authorized, at least a majority of the eligible
public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote in favor
of the agreement. In a referendum on a fair-share agreement, if
less than two-thirds but more than one-half of the eligible public
safety employees vote in favor of the agreement, a maintenance of
membership agreement is authorized.

Madison Teachers Inc. is a union representing over 4000 municipal
employees of the Madison Metropolitan School District. Local 61 represents
approximately 300 City of Milwaukee employees.
23
See Madison Teachers Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (2014).
In August 2011, Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public
Employees Local 61 sued Governor Walker and the three
commissioners of the Wisconsin Employment Relations
22
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alia, that Act 10 violated the constitutional free speech, free association and
equal protection rights of the represented employees. The Wisconsin Circuit
Court agreed with the unions and invalidated several provisions of Act 10,
including those related to collective bargaining. On July 31, 2014 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 5 to 2 decision reversed the lower court
ruling and upheld Act 10 in its entirety. The Court’s view was that while
union members certainly enjoy a constitutional right to free association, that
protection does not extend to collective bargaining. Justice Gableman wrote
for the majority:
This point is vital and bears repeating: the plaintiff’s associational
rights are in no way implicated by Act 10’s modifications to Wisconsin’s
collective bargaining framework. At issue in this case is the State’s
implementation of an exclusive representation system for permitting public
employers and public employees to negotiate certain employment terms in
good faith . . . Represented municipal employees, non-represented municipal
employees, and certified representatives lose no right or ability to associate
to engage in constitutionally protected speech because their ability to do so
outside the framework of statutory collective bargaining is not impaired. Act
10 merely provides general employees with a statutory mechanism to force
their employer to collectively bargain; outside of this narrow context, to
which the plaintiffs freely concede public employees have no constitutional
right, every avenue for petitioning the government remains available.24
Essentially, the majority in Walker adopts the view that
constitutional protections of freedom of association are not impaired because
Commission challenging several provisions of Act 10. The
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that four aspects of Act
10—the collective bargaining limitations, the prohibition on
payroll deductions of labor organization dues, the prohibition of
fair share agreements, and the annual recertification
requirements—violate the constitutional associational and equal
protection rights of the employees they represent. The plaintiffs
also challenged Wis. Stat. § 62.623 (2011-12), a separate
provision created by Act 10, which prohibits the City of
Milwaukee from paying the employee share of contributions to
the City of Milwaukee Employees’ Retirement System, alleging it
violates the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution.
The plaintiffs argued, in the alternative, that if Wis. Stat. § 62.623
does not violate the home rule amendment, it nevertheless violates
the constitutionally protected right of parties to contract with each
other.
Id. at 345.
24
Id. at 355-365.
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Act 10 does not limit the ability of any member to associate outside of the
“framework”.25 Fairly predictable responses followed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision.26
B.

FEDERAL LITIGATION

The Seventh Circuit has twice had occasion to consider Act 10. In
Wisconsin Education Assoc. Council v. Walker27 and Laborers Local 236 v.
Walker,28 the Court considered the payroll deduction provisions and the free
Id. at 356 (“The defendants are not barring the plaintiffs from joining any
advocacy groups, limiting their ability to do so, or otherwise curtailing the ability to
join other ‘like-minded’ individuals to associate for the purpose of expressing
commonly held views…”).
26
Nick Novak, Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds Scott Walker’s Act 10 “in
its Entirety”, MACIVER INST. (Jul. 31, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.maciver
institute.com/2014/07/wisconsin-supreme-court-upholds-act-10-in-its-entirety/
(“Act 10 has saved Wisconsin taxpayers more than $3 billion. Today’s ruling is a
victory for those hard-working taxpayers”); See also id. (“Wisconsin’s proud history
of protecting worker’s rights is marred by Walker and Republicans’ dismantling of
collective bargaining for our public sector workers. Today’s Supreme Court ruling
is extremely disappointing for the teachers, nurses, prison guards, and other
professionals who serve the public each day.”).
27
Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F. 3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs and cross-appellants, representing seven of Wisconsin's
largest public sector unions (the "Unions"), filed suit against
defendants-appellants Governor Scott Walker and other state
actors, challenging three provisions of the statute—the limitations
on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a
prohibition on payroll deduction of dues—under the Equal
Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction
provision under the First Amendment. The district court
invalidated Act 10's recertification and payroll deduction
provisions, but upheld the statute's limitation on collective
bargaining. We now uphold Act 10 in its entirety.
Id. at 642.
28
Laborers Local 236, AFL-CIO v. Walker, 749 F. 3d 628 (7th Cir. 2014).
This case raises more challenges to the constitutionality of
Wisconsin's Act 10, which we last addressed in [Wis. Educ. Ass’n
Council v Walker]. Act 10 made significant changes to Wisconsin
public-sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from
collectively bargaining with their general employees over
anything except base wages, made it more challenging for generalemployee unions to obtain certification as exclusive bargaining
25
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association implications of Act 10. The 7th Circuit rejected the argument
that the prohibition on payroll deductions violated the First Amendment,
reasoning that the unions’ previous use of the payroll system was the
equivalent of the state subsidizing the unions’ speech and that Wisconsin
was free to withdraw this subsidy so long as it did so on a viewpoint neutral
basis.29
The second case—Laborers Local 236—rehashed arguments made
unsuccessfully in Wisconsin state court—i.e. that Act 10 impaired union
members’ right to freedom of association. The argument, which the 7th
Circuit rejected, was essentially that Act 10 undermines the ability of labor
organizations to continue to function and weakens their association to a
devastating extent, thereby depriving members of the right to freedom of
association. Judge Flaum wrote for the majority:
[T]he First Amendment does not require the state to
maintain policies that allow certain associations to
thrive…Act 10 only acts upon the state. The law’s changes
agents, and precluded general-employee unions from using
automatic payroll deductions and fair-share agreements. The
plaintiffs, two public-employee unions and an individual union
member, argue that these changes infringe their First Amendment
petition and association rights. They also argue that Act 10 denies
union members the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 628.
29
See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 705 F.3d at 645.
Act 10's payroll deduction prohibitions do not violate the First
Amendment. The Unions offer several different First Amendment
theories to rebut the compelling deference of rational basis review
required under applicable law. Ultimately, none apply because the
Supreme Court has settled the question: use of the state's payroll
systems to collect union dues is a state subsidy of speech that
requires only viewpoint neutrality. (citations omitted) Admittedly,
the Unions do offer some evidence of viewpoint discrimination in
the words of then-Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald
suggesting Act 10, by limiting unions' fundraising capacity, would
make it more difficult for President Obama to carry Wisconsin in
the 2012 presidential election. While Senator Fitzgerald's
statement may not reflect the highest of intentions, his sentiments
do not invalidate an otherwise constitutional, viewpoint neutral
law. Consequently, Act 10's prohibition on payroll dues deduction
does not violate the First Amendment.
Id.
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prevent public employers from acting in certain ways, or
adopting certain procedures, that were once beneficial to
Wisconsin public-sector unions and their members. We
take the plaintiffs’ point that Act 10 will likely have the
effect of making things more challenging for generalemployee unions . . . But this type of impairment is not one
that the Constitution prohibits . . . An organization cannot
come up with an associational purpose—even a purpose that
involves speech—and then require support from the state in
order to realize its goal.30
C.

FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACT 10

Perhaps the most important consequence of Act 10 has been its
debilitating effect on the many public sector unions affected by its terms.
The state’s largest teachers union, The Wisconsin Education Association
(WEAC) had approximately 100,000 members prior to the passage of Act
10.31 Since then, membership has dropped by more than 50% to
Labors Local 236 v. Walker, 749 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2014).
In Smith, the Supreme Court observed that ‘[f]ar from taking steps
to prohibit or discourage union membership or association, all that
[the state] has done in its challenged conduct is simply to ignore
the union. That it is free to do.’ 441 U.S. at 466, 99 S.Ct. 1826.”);
The same holds true here. The unions cannot wield the First
Amendment to force Wisconsin to engage in a dialogue or
continue the state's previous policies. For this reason, none of Act
10's proscriptions—individually or cumulatively—infringe the
unions' associational rights.
Id. at 638-639.
31
Molly Beck, WEAC Turns to Local Focus After Massive Membership Loss,
WISC. STATE J., Feb. 22, 2015, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/
local_schools/weac-turns-to-local-focus-after-massive-membershiploss/article_4e31a55e-575b-598f-bb40-6b8ab1e440c5.html.
Four years after public school teachers lost their guaranteed spot
at the bargaining table, Wisconsin’s largest teachers union has lost
more than half its membership and its spending at the Capitol has
all but disappeared. Now, local members of the Wisconsin
Education Association Council are turning their efforts toward
school board races and reaching out to parents in an effort to
eventually regain some influence in Madison. . . . About 40,000
public school employees are represented by WEAC, Dustin
Beilke, Region 6 director told the State Journal editorial board last
week. WEAC spokeswoman, Christina Brey said it was thousands
30
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approximately 40,000 members as of early 2015. Dues cost approximately
$750.00 per teacher and it appears that many former members have decided
not to incur that expense.32

Id.

higher but declined to provide an exact number. Either way,
membership is down more than 50 percent from the union’s
98,000-member levels before Gov. Scott Walker signed his
signature legislation in 2011 that significantly diminished
collective bargaining rights for most public employees. WEAC’s
lobbying dollars have dropped dramatically, too. A decade ago,
WEAC spent $1.5 million on lobbying during the 2005-2006
legislative session, state records show. The next session: $1.1
million. During the two sessions leading up to the passage of Act
10, WEAC spent $2.5 million and $2.3 million, respectively. But
during the 2013-14 session, after Walker signed the bill into law,
the union spent just $175,540. It was the first time in at least 10
years that the union was not among the state’s top 12 lobbying
spenders, according to the Government Accountability Board.

Richard Moore, Members Chipped in $23.4 million to WEAC in 2008 Union
Dues, LAKELAND TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.lakelandtimes.com/
main.asp?SectionID=9&subsectionID=110&articleID=13387.
In addition to the $295.01 in annual dues that full-time teachers
shell out to the state unit, full-time professional members pay
$19.99 to the WEAC political action committee for political
campaigns and lobbying, as well as local union dues and $166 to
the National Education Association. Contributions to WEAC and
the NEA thus cost every full-time teacher $461 a year, while total
dues can swell to more than $750 a year per teacher. For example,
in the Lakeland area, teachers from Lakeland Union High School,
MHLT, AV-W, North Lakeland, and Lac du Flambeau chipped in
union dues totaling $191,746 for the 2010-11 year. According to
Rich Vought, the superintendent at North Lakeland, teachers pay
$759 per person there, for a total of $15,180. At AV-W, teachers
paid $40,194.40. For the 2010-11 school year, the local teachers'
association at LUHS will pay a total of $50,611.59 to their union,
says district administrator Todd Kleinhans. He said a full-time
teacher will pay $783 while dues for part-time teachers are prorated. MHLT teachers will pay a total of $38,832 in union dues $15,120 goes directly to WEAC - while the lump sum annual
amount Lac du Flambeau teachers paid in 2010-11 was $46,928.
Union dues are collected from employee paychecks and a monthly
check is cut from the district to the local union and sent to the
Northern Tier UniServe office in Rhinelander on behalf of the
32
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Financial hardship has translated into reduced political power.
According to the state of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, for
each of the three years leading up to Act 10’s passage, WEAC was either
first or second in total dollars spent lobbying at the state level.33 From 2009
to 2011 WEAC spent an average of $1.9 million per year on lobbying. After
Act 10, WEAC spent only $175,540 which meant it was not even in the top
twelve of lobbying spenders.34
Why did membership drop so dramatically? Act 10 meant that dues
could no longer be automatically withdrawn from member paychecks and
non-members were no longer required to make a “fair share” payment. If
you did not want to be a union member, you were now free to go it alone and
no longer compelled to pay the agency fee. This is precisely the result the
Friedrichs plaintiffs hoped for on a national scale.
A sample of comments from former WEAC members demonstrates
their post-Act 10 thinking:


Id.

“I don’t see the point of being in a union anymore. Everyone is on
their own island now. If you do a good job, everything will take care
of itself. The money I’d spend on dues is way more valuable to buy
groceries for my family.”35
union, Kleinhans said in an email. Because teachers are paid their
salaries over a 12-month period, union dues are sent for any
particular school year beginning in September and continuing
through August, he added.

See generally, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 2009-2010 Legislative Session
Lobbying Summary Reports (2014), http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
publication/68/2009reg_slaesummaryreport_pdf_20437.pdf;
Wis.
Gov’t
Accountability Bd., 2011-2012 Legislative Session Lobbying Summary Reports
(2014),
http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/68/2011reg_slaesummaryrep
ort_pdf_16649.pdf.
34
Beck, supra note 30, (“Walker spokeswoman Laurel Patrick said Saturday
that Act 10 ‘put the power back in the hands of the people and local governments,
saving Wisconsin taxpayers more than $3 million in the process and allowing public
employees the freedom to choose if they want to join a union.’”).
35
Robert Samuels, Walker’s Anti-Union Has Labor Reeling in Wisconsin, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inwisconsin-walkers-anti-union-law-has-crippled-labormovement/2015/02/22/1eb3ef82-b6f1-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html
(statement from 34-year old technology teacher Dan Anliker).
33
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“[Unions] are just not something I concern myself with…I just look
to keep improving my teaching in the best way I can and try to keep
my nose out of the other stuff.”36

A few unions were reported to have resorted to home visits designed to get
teachers to sign up for dues collection.37 None of these efforts appear to have
paid off though. In August 2001, WEAC issued layoff notices to about 40%
of its staff.38 This trend has not diminished—the New York Times reports:
36
Id. (quoting Sean Karsten, a 32-year-old middle and high school reading
instructor).
37
Lindsay Fiori, Teachers Unions Visit Homes for Dues Option, THE J. TIMES,
July 11, 2011, http://journaltimes.com/news/local/teachers-unions-visit-homes-fordues-option/article_ff07cf4a-abb0-11e0-bf87-001cc4c03286.html.
Racine County teachers may have union representatives show up
on their doorsteps this summer. Area teachers’ unions no longer
able to automatically deduct dues from teachers’ paychecks
because of the state’s new budget repair law are using a variety of
methods including home visits to sign up members to voluntarily
pay dues. . . .The unions . . . are using a combination of meetings,
emails, phone calls and home visits to get teachers signed up for
dues collection, said officials from United Lakewood Educators,
which includes the Muskego-Norway School District, and
Southern Lakes United Educators, which includes the Burlington,
North Cape, Union Grove, Washington-Caldwell, Waterford and
Drought districts. Officials from the union representing the 10th
district, Yorkville Federation of Teachers, which serves Yorkville
Elementary School, could not be reached.
Id.
38
Erin Richards, Diminished in the Wake of Act 10, 2 Teachers Unions Explore
Merger, J. SENTINEL (Jan. 7, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/education/
diminished-in-wake-of-act-10-2-teachers-unions-explore-merger-b99174118z1239150441.html.
Facing reduced membership, revenue and political power in the
wake of 2011 legislation, Wisconsin's two major state teacher’s
unions appear poised to merge into a new organization called
Wisconsin Together. The merger would combine the Wisconsin
Education Association Council, the state's largest teacher’s union,
and AFT-Wisconsin, a smaller union that includes technical
college, higher education and state employees . . .The
developments underscore the changing landscape for Wisconsin
teachers unions since the passage of Act 10, which limits
collective bargaining and makes it more difficult for unions to
collect dues. After Act 10, WEAC has lost about a third of its
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“[s]ince [Act 10 passed] … union membership has dropped precipitously.
Long a labor stronghold, the state has lost tens of thousands of union
members, leaving Wisconsin with a smaller percentage of union members
than the national average, new federal figures show. . . . The drop is most
pronounced in the public sector: more than half of Wisconsin’s public
workers were in unions before Mr. Walker’s cuts took effect. A little more
than a quarter of them remain.”39
How and why did this happen in Wisconsin? It helps to understand
that in 2011 the state faced a $3.6 billion dollar deficit that looked to extend
into 2012 and 2013 budget years. Wisconsin attempted layoffs and
furloughs40 but the lingering recession and rising compensation levels for
public employees appears to have created an environment toxic to the claims
of the public sector unions. While Act 10 protected the status quo for public
safety employees,41 Walker argued persuasively that it was the inflexibility
of the state’s public sector unions that created the crisis. Act 10, he asserted,

Id.

approximately 98,000 members and AFT-Wisconsin is down to
about 6,500 members from its peak of approximately 16,000,
leaders of both organizations have reported. . . . Both have
downsized staff and expenses.

Monica Davey, With Fewer Members, a Diminished Political Role for Wisconsin
Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/ 28/us/withfewer-members-a-diminished-political-role-for-wisconsin-unions.html?_r=0.
40
Melanie Trottman, Public-worker Unions Steel for Budget Fights, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703989
50457612850231640306.
Public-sector unions have begun using their clout against efforts
to roll back government workers' wages and benefits, cut jobs and
curtail contract bargaining rights as political leaders from both
parties look for ways to cut spending. Two of the nation's biggest
public-sector unions, which together represent about 2.2 million
government workers, are facing a backlash against the rising costs
of public workers' pay, benefits and pensions. As states and local
governments seek to trim costs in a difficult economy, the unions
are struggling to defend pay and benefit packages negotiated when
times were flush.
Id.
41
Gesina M. Seiler, Court Upholds Part of Controversial Wisconsin Collective
Bargaining Law, 21 WIS. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2012) (included in the category of
public safety employees are “police officers, deputy sheriffs, firefighters, state patrol
officers and state motor vehicle inspectors.”).
39
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was a way to avoid cutting budgets and popular eliminating programs in the
face of public sector union intransigence.42
For example, the Mequon-Thiensville School District near
Milwaukee froze teacher salaries for two years thereby saving $560,000. It
saved an additional $400,000 by requiring higher contributions to healthcare
plans. Administrators argue that circumventing the collective bargaining
process and the union allowed them to “shift money out of the health plan
and back into the classroom. [They]’ve increased programming” as a result.43
It is clear that Walker successfully portrayed the public unions as
selfish and intransigent in the face of financial crisis. It is also clear that the
consequences of Act 10 have been nothing short of catastrophic for those
unions.44 Shockingly, between 2011 and 2014, membership of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) fell from
1000 to 122.45 The loss of members and revenue of course meant a loss in
political clout as well. The long-term question for Wisconsin and other states
that have eliminated agency fees46 is whether, in addition to the short-term
42

Id.

See id.
There’s no question that Wisconsin may bar its public employees
from engaging in collective bargaining. The only question for the
court was whether the state could restrict the rights of general
employees while granting full rights to public-safety employees.
The law allows such “line drawing” as long as the government can
articulate a rational basis for doing so and a suspect class isn’t
involved. State officials argued that the law doesn’t limit the
bargaining rights of members who perform the most essential
functions of maintaining public safety because of concerns over
strikes.

Greenhouse, supra note 10 (quoting Ted Neitzke, school superintendent in
West Bend, Wisconsin). See id. (statement of James R. Scott, chairman of the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission) (“[A]s a result of Act 10, the
advantages that labor held have been diminished. . . . It’s fair to say that employers
have the upper hand now.”).
44
See generally, Charles J. Russo, Collective Bargaining in Public Education:
It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times, 291 ED. L. REP. 545 (2013);
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 293 (2012); Samuels, supra note 35. See also Appendix A.
45
Greenhouse, supra note 10, at 8 (statement from Wisconsin attorney, Lester
A. Pines) (“The law . . . is destroying unions with a thousand cuts and making it
seem that it’s their fault.”).
46
See Mike Antonucci, Teachers Unions at Risk of Losing “Agency Fees”, 16
EDU. NEXT 22, fig. 1 at 27 (2016), http://educationnext.org/teachers-unions-risk43
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savings the state and its municipalities were able to obtain, a longer term
restructuring of wages and benefits will be possible. Benefits are likely to
be the primary focus both in Wisconsin and beyond as the compensation gap
between private and public employees seems to support a conclusion that it
is benefits and not wages that are exceptional in the public sector.
III.

ARE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES OVERPAID?

Were cities and towns that responded to Act 10 by freezing salaries,
cutting benefits and generally holding the line on public employee labor
costs after 2011 in fact “right sizing” or were they simply taking advantage
of a newly politically vulnerable group of employees? It turns out that
figuring out whether or not public employees are overcompensated is trickier
than it seems. There is a substantial literature that purports to demonstrate
that public school teachers and other public sector workers are overpaid.47
Public Sector unions, for their part, have made some attempts to refute this
losing-agency-fees-friedrichs-california/ (providing map of which states allow for
agency fees to be collected and which do not).
47
See, e.g., Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Assessing the Compensation
of public-school teachers, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (2011) (“[w]e conclude that
public-school teacher salaries are comparable to those paid to similarly skilled
private sector workers, but that more generous fringe benefits for public-school
teachers, including greater job security, make total compensation 52 percent greater
than fair market levels, equivalent to more than $120 billion overcharged to
taxpayers each year.”); Steven Greenhut, California Faces Death by Pension, THE
AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Oct. 29, 2014 8:00 AM), http://spectator.org/
60778_california-faces-death-pension/ (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s chief
pension adviser, David Crane, giving testimony in 2010 before the California
Senate) (“All of the consequences of rising pension costs fall on the budgets for
programs such as higher education, health and human services, parks and recreation
and environmental protection that are junior in priority and therefore have their
funding reduced whenever more money is needed to pay for pension costs[.]”);
Robert C. Pozen, The Other Debt Bomb in Public Employee Benefits, THE WALL ST.
J., Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-c-pozen-the-other-debt-bombin-public-employee-benefits-1421367030 (noting that New York City has unfunded
retiree health care liabilities of $22,857 per household and recommending that
jurisdictions increase disclosure of costs as a mechanism which would encourage
voters to consider reform); Mark Casciari & Barbara Borowski, Rightsizing Public
Employee Retirement Benefits: How Have State Courts Resolved the Constitutional
Issues?, 26 BENEFITS. L. J. 22 (2013) (suggesting that states will continue to try and
cutback state and local employee benefits as long as they are facing funding
shortfalls).
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view.48 Scholarly work that is not overly politicized seems to provide some
support for the Walker view:
After controlling for skill differences and incorporating
employer costs for benefits packages, we find that, on
average, public sector workers in state government have
compensation costs 3-10 percent greater than those for
workers in the private sector, while in local government the
gap is 10-19 percent. We caution that this finding is
somewhat dependent on the chosen sample and
specification, that averages can obscure broader differences
in distributions, and that a host of worker and job attributes
are not available to us in these data. Nonetheless that data
suggest that public sector workers, especially local
government ones, on average, receive greater remuneration
than observably similar private sector workers.49
A.

A MORAL HAZARD STORY

As I’ve argued elsewhere,50 there is certainly a growing body of
evidence which supports the Walker narrative: that when public finances are
See Nicholas Kristof, Pay Teachers More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at
WK10 (“A basic educational challenge is not that teachers are raking it in, but that
they are underpaid. If we want to compete with other countries, and chip away at
poverty across America, then we need to pay teachers more so as to attract better
people into the profession. . . . These days, brilliant women become surgeons and
investment bankers — and 47 percent of America’s kindergarten through 12th-grade
teachers come from the bottom one-third of their college classes [as measured by
SAT scores]”).
49
Maury Gittleman & Brooks Pierce, Compensation for State and Local
Government Workers, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 217 (2011) (observing two sets of
data) (“[I]n both data sets, the raw wage gap shows public sector workers being paid
more. In [one], the raw gap in hourly earnings is about 4 percent; in the [other],
hourly wages in government sectors exceed those in the private sector by an average
of about 30 percent.”).
50
See e.g., Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing
Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525 (2013).
If the core problem is . . . a strong tendency to overpromise
because of strong forces that encourage morally hazardous
behavior, who should bear the cost when a municipality cannot
keep the promises it made? Does it matter that municipal creditors
are typically either very sophisticated—i.e., bondholders and their
48
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insurers—or possibly less savvy but often intimately involved in
a long pattern of reckless spending that has directly contributed to
the financial crisis—i.e., public employees and the unions that
represent them? . . . Culpability for the mess in Central Falls
certainly resides with the political actors who, aided and abetted
by public employees, promised benefits far beyond what the poor
town could afford. . . . Politicians are well known for their cavalier
attitude toward “other people’s money. . . .The guilty role played
by public employees and their representatives is by now so well
understood that it requires little further explanation. Suffice it to
say that the public employee/legislator relationship was beneficial
to all concerned save the current and future taxpayer. Can the
elected official/lender/public employee axis be broken? The only
way forward appears to be some combination of structural
changes and increased transparency. A variety of proposals have
been advanced in recent years; terminating defined benefit plans
and moving employees to defined contribution arrangements
similar to the private sector’s 401 (k) vehicle is among the most
promising. Modest reforms include requiring public plans to use
realistic, market-based rates of return when making assumptions
about asset growth that directly impact the size of future liabilities.
More radical, but perhaps not unreasonable in extreme situations
. . . is the call to simply bar legislators from negotiating with public
unions about pensions and/or retiree health benefits.
Id. at 529, 543, 555-557.
See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case for Public Pension Reform: Early From
Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585 (2014).
The first sign that over promising has occurred with pension
promises is often the failure of the state, as with Kentucky, to
make its required contribution. Why is payment not made as
promised? Well, legislators remember that they have a variety of
other commitments besides pensions - public education, roads,
prisons, public health - to name a few. These generally require
immediate spending in order to satisfy the public's demand for
services. Pensions, on the other hand, are a future expense which
can be delayed. Over time, of course, repeated delay creates a
larger and larger shortfall which must one day be made up. But,
that long term horizon is not the horizon for the typical politician
who hopes/expects to have moved on to bigger and better things
by the time the shortfall has mushroomed into a full blown crisis.
Id. at 596-597.
See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for PostEmployment Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317, 368-369 (2016) (“Numerous state
and local government employers have been forced to reckon with the size and scope

2016 FRIEDRICHS – ORDERING OF WAGES AND BENEFITS

201

tight and tax increases are politically infeasible, the natural cost cutting
response one might expect to see is often thwarted by labor agreements
which bind local governments to a cost structure that is unsustainable. It is
not generally wages but instead the promises made with respect to employee
benefits—pension costs and active and retiree health care commitments—
that overwhelm states51 and municipalities alike. The reason for this, like all
stories about morally hazardous52 behavior, is rooted in the cavalier way in
of benefits that had been promised to public employees - often without much thought
to the future cost to taxpayers. Indeed, some states are still trying, very publicly, to
come to terms with the cost of post-employment benefits that threaten to crowd out
all other spending.”).
51
See e.g., David W. Chen & Mary Williams Walsh, New York City Pension
System Is Strained by Costs and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/nyregion/new-york-city-pension-system-isstrained-by-costs-and-politics.html.
For years, New York City has been dutifully pumping more and
more money into its giant pension system for retired city workers.
. . . But instead of getting smaller, the city’s pension hole just
keeps getting bigger, forcing progressively more significant
cutbacks in municipal programs and services every year. Like
pension systems everywhere, New York City’s has been strained
by a growing retiree population that is living longer, global market
conditions and other factors. But a close examination of the
system’s problems reveals a more glaring issue: Its investment
strategy has failed to keep up with its growing costs, hampered by
an antiquated and inefficient governing structure that often
permits politics to intrude on decisions. The $160 billion system
is spread across five separate funds, each with its own board of
trustees, all making decisions with further input from consultants
and even lawmakers in Albany. . .. Like many public systems,
New York has promised irrevocable pension benefits to city
workers on the thinking that fund investments would grow enough
to cover the cost — but they have not. Its response so far has been
to take advantage of a recovering local economy and inject a lot
more city money into the pension system quickly — an option not
available to declining cities like Detroit, which filed for
bankruptcy last year, or a tax-averse state like New Jersey, which
has been underfunding its pension system for years.
Id.
52
See Definition of ‘Moral Hazard’, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard (the Economic Times
defining moral hazard as “[A] situation in which one party gets involved in a risky
event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other party will incur the
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which human beings behave when they are tasked with spending other
people’s money.
The key insight offered by the study of moral hazard is that people
treat valuable resources differently—the degree of care exercised depends
on the ownership of those resources. When dollars that belong to someone
else are being spent the level of care is much lower than what is observed
when owned dollars are expended. This phenomenon is easy to observe in
almost any insurance context. Homeowners and automobile insurers, for
example, routinely require deductibles in order to minimize the likelihood
that an insured will simply exercise an unacceptable level of care given the
presence of the insurance. The homeowner, for example, who carelessly
neglects to put out a cigarette or extinguish a fire in the fireplace or the
automobile owner who parks in a dangerous neighborhood and fails to lock
her vehicle are much more likely to be careful with their property in the
absence of any insurance. Insurance, well aware of this problem, insist on
“sharing the loss” by requiring deductibles; health insurers, wary of
unnecessary visits to the doctor do the same thing by way of co-pays and
other forms of cost sharing.
How is this connected to public sector employee benefits? The story
of how so many cities and states have ended up overpaying for employee
benefits is fundamentally a story about simple moral hazard too. Elected
officials, entrusted by voters to negotiate wages and benefits with public
sector employees are especially vulnerable to the moral hazard encountered
when considering how to spend taxpayer dollars. Aware that the taxpayer is
almost certainly not paying attention to the details53 and eager to keep well
organized groups of public employees who both vote and provide support
during election campaigns happy, elected officials have, time and again,
cost. It arises when both the parties have incomplete information about each other.”).
An example of moral hazard would be a homeowner with full homeowner’s
insurance choosing not to install a security system because he or she know the
insurance company will bear the burden, should a burglary occur. See id.
53
Hence the calls by Pozen and others for greater transparency. Since 2003, the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) has been studying
government action and suggested that states should be more transparent in their
functions, particularly in financial statements. GASB even suggests that derivatives
be included in financial statement in order make more transparent what the
government is leveraging to accomplish deals and transactions. See Derivatives:
GASB Proposes More Transparency, USER’S PERSP. (Gov’t Accounting Standards
Bd. Norwalk, C.T.) May 2006, http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=GASBContent_
C&pagename=GASB%2FGASBContent_C%2FUsersArticlePage&cid=11761567
37013.
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opted to over promise in the present and let future generations worry about
how to pay later. This is unequivocally the subtext from Illinois54 to
California55 and Rhode Island.56
See Hal Dardick, Illinois Supreme Court ruling forces city to find new fix for
2 pension funds, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-pension-law-ruling-0325-20160323story.html.
The Illinois Supreme Court dealt Mayor Rahm Emanuel — and in
turn Chicago taxpayers — a big blow on Thursday when it found
unconstitutional a law that aimed to shore up two city pension
funds by cutting benefits and requiring workers to pay more
toward retirement. A group of unions, current workers and retired
employees sued in response to the law, noting the 1970 Illinois
Constitution states that pension benefits, once granted, ‘shall not
be diminished or impaired.’ In a 5-0 ruling, the state's high court
once again agreed with that argument, less than a year after
reaching the same conclusion in a separate case covering state
pension systems. . . . The new ruling raises further questions about
the city's precarious financial situation. . . . [T]he loss also
exacerbates the city's massive financial problems over the long
term — the funding shortfall in the two retirement funds would
continue to grow by about $900 million a year, and taxpayers
could end up plugging the gap.
Id.
55
See Melody Petersen, California public workers may be at risk of losing
promised pensions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-pension-controversy-20150317-story.html.
As millions of private employees lost their pension benefits in
recent years, government workers rested easy, believing that their
promised retirements couldn't be touched. Now the safety of a
government pension in California may be fading fast. Feeling the
heat is the state's huge public pension fund, the California Public
Employees' Retirement System, known as CalPERS. The fund
spent millions of dollars to defend itself and public employee
pensions in the bankruptcy cases of two California cities — only
to lose the legal protections that it had spent years building
through legislation. The agency's most significant setback came in
Stockton's bankruptcy case. The judge approved the city's
recovery plan, including maintaining employees' pensions, but
ruled that Stockton could have legally chosen to cut workers'
retirements . . . . Part of the problem is that many cities have
promised workers pensions that are more generous than those still
offered in the private sector. Many government workers retire at
50 or 55 on lifelong payments that can nearly match their salaries
54
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In Wisconsin it really did not matter whether the unions were as
intransigent as Walker portrayed them; what was critical is that the public
came to believe that when a financial crisis struck, public sector employees
were unwilling to face the same reduced circumstances as private sector
taxpayers. Job loss, pay cuts, increased health care expenses57—painfully

Id.

if they were longtime employees. Increasing payments to
CalPERS was one reason that Stockton and San Bernardino were
forced to file for bankruptcy. . . . CalPERS' efforts to protect itself
and workers' retirements began decades ago when it pushed
through two state laws with help from the politically powerful
unions. The first law said that a city's contract with CalPERS
could not be canceled in bankruptcy. The second allowed
CalPERS to place a costly lien on a city's property — in essence,
a new and far more expensive bill for pensions — if the city left
CalPERS and provided retirement benefits through a different
fund. The cost of the threatened lien was so steep — in Stockton,
CalPERS demanded $1.6 billion — that no city in bankruptcy has
left the fund.

See Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted
Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcyover-pension-promises.html.
The small city of Central Falls, R.I., appears to be headed for a
rare municipal bankruptcy filing, and state officials are rushing to
keep its woes from overwhelming the struggling state. The
impoverished city, operating under a receiver for a year, has
promised $80 million worth of retirement benefits to 214 police
officers and firefighters, far more than it can afford. Those
workers’ pension fund will probably run out of money in October,
giving Central Falls the distinction of becoming the second
municipality in the United States to exhaust its pension fund, after
Prichard, Ala. . . . Some of the retirees are in their 90s, and Central
Falls, like many American cities, has not placed its police and
firefighters in Social Security. Many have no other benefits to fall
back on.
Id.
57
The Cadillac Tax in the Affordable Care Act will begin enforcing a 40% tax
of any health plan for the amount of the plan that exceeds $10,200 (for an individual
plan) and $27,500 (for a family plan) in 2018. This was meant to ensure employees
kept the cost of health insurance in mind and did not require employers to dole out
too much for high insurance, but it resulted in union resentment, as unions have
begun to have the tax leveraged against them in collective bargaining agreements.
56
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experienced by those without the benefit of a union—did not result in union
envy but in union resentment. Private sector workers did not wish they could
join a public sector union; instead they wished that those who were already
members would accept less so that taxes would not have to be increased or
services decreased in order to survive the crisis.
The Great Recession which began in 2008 laid bare the huge
differences in job protections, health care costs and retirement benefits
enjoyed by public and private sector employees.58 Private sector employers
shed workers rapidly as needed. Meanwhile, the public sector unions seemed
impervious to the resentment their generous benefits and job security
engendered.59 People who collected unemployment benefits60 and struggled
See Kate Taylor, Health Care Law Raises Pressure On Public Unions, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2013), at A1.
58
See Michael Cooper, Government Jobs Have Grown Since Recession, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/20states.html.
While the private sector has shed 6.9 million jobs since the
beginning of the recession, state and local governments have
expanded their payrolls and added 110,000 jobs . . . The
expansion, coming as many states and localities are raising taxes,
troubled Tad DeHaven, a budget analyst for the Cato Institute, a
libertarian research group in Washington. ‘That is disturbing,’ Mr.
DeHaven said. ‘Basically what you have is your producers in
society losing their jobs and looking for work, and their tax burden
isn’t necessarily going down — and as a matter of fact they are
likely to face tax increases going forward — and government
growing.’ . . . . The disparity between the public and private sector
job market is striking in places like Boise, Idaho. Since the
recession began, the area’s unemployment rate has more than
doubled, to over 10.1 percent in June, as big employers, especially
in the technology sector, shed workers. The Boise area lost 20,000
jobs in the year ending in June, the Idaho Labor Department said,
and saw real gains only in government, which had an increase of
1,400 jobs, mostly in the public schools.
Id.
59
Dave Umhoefer, Gov. Scott Walker says he asked unions for concessions and
they refused, POLTIFACT (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/
statements/2011/sep/16/scott-walker/gov-scott-walker-says-he-asked-unionsconcessions-/ (quoting a campaign fundraising letter written by Scott Walker, dated
Sept. 2, 2011) (“I asked the unions to pay into their own health care insurance and
they said I was being unreasonable . . . I requested that they contribute toward their
own pensions and they screamed it was unfair.").
60
Each state’s unemployment system works slightly differently, but to qualify
there are some general requirements most states include. The unemployed worker
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to hold onto their homes61 could simply not be counted on to listen
sympathetically to proposals to raise taxes in order to honor promises made
to teachers and others whose still—employed status inspired raw envy.
It appears that in Wisconsin and elsewhere public sector unions
either couldn’t or wouldn’t confront the relatively luxurious status of their
members. Walker saw an open door and walked through it. The plaintiffs
must be unemployed (not part-time or self-employed), must make a claim and
cooperate with their local unemployment office, and must be ready, willing, and able
to work. If an unemployed worker meets all the eligibility requirements and follows
the guidance of their local unemployment office, they can generally collect pay
through federal and state unemployment taxes. See The Unemployment Benefits
System: How it Works and When to Contest a Claim, BIZFILINGS (May 2, 2016),
http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/sbg/office-hr/managing-theworkplace/unemployment-benefits-system-info.aspx.
61
Ingrid Gould Ellen & Samuel Dastrup, Housing and the Great Recession,
RECESSION TRENDS, STAN. CTR. POVERTY AND INEQ. (Oct. 2012).
Since the first quarter of 2006, U.S. households have lost over $7
trillion in home equity. As a result, CoreLogic estimates that 22
percent of homeowners with mortgages are now “underwater,” or
have an outstanding mortgage balance that exceeds the value of
their home. . . . Equity losses also appear to have been particularly
severe for minority households. A recent study by the Pew
Research Center found that median wealth fell by 66 percent from
2005 to 2009 among Hispanic households and 53 percent among
Black households, as compared with just 16 percent among White
households . . . Reductions in homeownership rates following the
housing crash have also been more extreme for minority groups.
While all racial and ethnic groups have experienced a decline in
homeownership in recent years, the fall has been sharpest for
Blacks and Latinos . . . just 44.2 percent of Black households and
47.1 percent of Latino households owned their homes in 2010,
down from 46.3 and 49.3 percent respectively in 2006 . . .
homeownership rates have also fallen much more sharply for
young adults as compared to older adults. This is both because
transitions out of homeownership are less likely for older
homeowners and because transitions into homeownership have
slowed due to the weak labor market, uncertainty about prices, and
tightened underwriting. . . . Data from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development show that the estimated number
of homeless families in the United States rose by 30 percent to
170,000 from 2007 to 2009, with the average length of stays in
shelters rising during the recession as well.
Id. at 2-5.
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in Friedrichs sensed the same vulnerability and, but for the unexpected
change in the composition of the Supreme Court, almost obtained the same
result. There is no doubt but that Wisconsin’s experience would have been
duplicated around the country in states that permit the collection of agency
fees. It is certain that membership in public sector unions would have
declined rapidly along with revenue and lobbying efforts. States would
suddenly discover that public sector employee benefits were slightly more
vulnerable at least to future reductions.62

See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Understanding the Legal Limits on Public Pension
Reform, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. at 5 (2013) (“Arizona’s constitution specifically
protects public employee pensions by providing that ‘membership in a public
retirement system is a contractual relationship that is subject to Article II, §25, and
public retirement system benefits shall not be diminished or impaired’”); Amy B.
Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, The Legal Framework, U. of Minn. L.
School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 10-13.
A handful of states have rejected a contract-based approach to
public pensions in favor of a property-based approach. To the
extent that rights in a public pension plan are considered property,
they are protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution from deprivation without due process of law.
In addition, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits the taking of property without just compensation.
Id. at 24.
See also David J. Kahne, Protecting Pensions And Contract Rights For Public
Sector Employees, STROOCK REPS. (STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP) August
4, 2015.
Public sector employees in certain states can use the nonimpairment clause to protect their pension rights from unilateral
reductions imposed by a state or local government. Under many
state constitutions, including New York's, pensions are granted
contractual status. Article V § 7 of the New York State
Constitution declares that, "membership in any pension or
retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be
a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired." Notably, there is no qualification. Thus,
any judicial or legislative action that seeks to impair pension rights
is arguably a violation of New York's Non-Impairment Clause.
Case law and the legislative history confirms that the purpose of
New York's Non-Impairment Clause was "to fix the rights of the
employees at the time of commencement of membership in the
[pension] system, rather than as previously at retirement." The
clause prohibits unilateral action by either the Legislature or the
62
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FRIEDRICHS AGAIN?

It seems likely that the organizations63 which coordinated and funded the
Friedrichs litigation will try again. Public school teachers will probably
employer that would diminish or impair the rights employees have
gained through their membership in the system.

Id.
Further, states like Illinois have declared benefits such as healthcare for retired state
workers to be a “constitutionally protected pension benefit.” See Karl Plume, Illinois
high court rules constitution protects health benefits, REUTERS (July 3, 2014)
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-illinois-retiree-healthcareidUSL2N0PE10720140703 (“'It's too soon to say what the implications of this ruling
are,’ said . . . senior credit officer Ted Hampton. But he added that it ‘casts doubt’
on the pension reform law.”).
63
One such example is the Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”). See Mission,
CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2016), https://www.cir-usa.org/mission/ (“The
Center for Individual Rights (CIR) is a non-profit public interest law firm dedicated
to the defense of individual liberties against the increasingly aggressive and
unchecked authority of federal and state governments.”); Freidrichs v CTA: Case
Timeline, supra note 1. On September 10th and 11th, 2015, there were 25 different
Amicus Briefs filed in support of the Plaintiff. See Docket 14-915, Freidrichs v. Cal.
Teachers Ass’n. 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016). One Amicus Brief, filed by the Cato
Institute, delivered a stinging and unrelenting attack on labor unions’ “opt-out”
practices currently in place, requiring people who rejected joining the union, but are
forced to pay agency fees, to affirmatively out-out of particular ideological or
political speech. Brief for the Cato Institute As Amicus Curiae In Support of
Petitioners, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016).
For the reasons stated in Harris v. Quinn, (citation omitted), the
First Amendment does not permit government to compel public
employees to associate with a labor union and subsidize its speech
on matters of public concern. The Court should therefore overrule
its aberrant decision to the contrary in Abood . . . the opt-out
scheme administered by Respondents is designed to ensnare
dissenting teachers who inadvertently fail to register an objection
during the prescribed opt-out period, as well as those who
subsequently come to oppose the union’s political speech. A
teacher, for example, might assume that the California Teachers
Association’s political and ideological speech is confined to issues
relating to education and public schools and may well be surprised
to learn partway through the school year that it engages in
advocacy on abortion, immigration re- form, and other
controversial issues. Yet that teacher is required to subsidize the
union’s speech on those matters—with funds deducted from her
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remain a fertile group from which to recruit plaintiffs given the ongoing
fights around the country over charter schools and the efficacy of public
schools.64 The speed with which the Court is asked to review Abood will
certainly depend on the perceived receptivity of Scalia’s replacement to the
First Amendment claims made by the Friedrichs plaintiffs.65 Taxpayers,
paycheck week after week—until the next opportunity to opt out.
This is a plain-as-day violation of the “bedrock principle” that “no
person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a
third party that he or she does not wish to support.” Harris, 134 S.
Ct. at 2644. A decision flipping the presumption—from opt out to
opt in—would correct this wholesale infringement of First
Amendment rights and put labor unions on an equal footing with
all other groups that rely on truly voluntary contributions.
Id. at 1-3.
64
One principal, Kelian Betlach, at Elmhurst Community Prep in Oakland,
California faces the same problem every year:
[A] common one at schools like Elmhurst, where 91 percent of
students qualify for free- or reduced-price lunch, a federal measure
of poverty, and 33 percent are classified as English language
learners. Many of the factors keeping teachers from showing up at
schools like his are beyond the control of any single principal.
Across the country, an improving economy has pulled teachers
and potential teachers away from the profession, creating a
growing national shortage. In California . . . competition for
qualified teachers is particularly stiff. . . . Chronic underfunding
of schools in California means that teaching jobs are not as secure
as they once were and, in many parts of the state, a teacher’s salary
won’t sustain a middle-class lifestyle. At the same time, a growing
number of urban charter schools, focused on the same population
as schools like Elmhurst, offer bigger paychecks for young,
ambitious teachers willing to tie their salaries to their
performance—a particularly fraught issue in California. . . .
Finding and keeping teachers who can excel at working in urban
schools may seem a Sisyphean task. And yet it is one at which
principals like Betlach must succeed, every year, or risk their
students’ fragile educational progress.
Lillian Mongeau, Teachers Wanted: Passion a Must, Patience Required, Pay
Negligible: Turnover is highest in the neediest schools, and competition for new
educators is getting stiffer, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2015/09/teachers-wanted-passion-a-must-patience-required-paynegligible/404371/.
65
The Senate is trying its hardest to ensure that Scalia’s replacement is at least
somewhat ideologically close to the late Justice. The Senate has evaded voting, or
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legislators and public sector unions everywhere should both anticipate the
renewal of this dispute and focus on the core policy questions it raises. Are
public sector benefits too generous? Are public employees overpaid in some
fundamental sense? If indeed public sector collective bargaining is just a
species of lobbying which has resulted in the “capture” of various
legislatures around the country,66 then legislators and public sector unions
might do well to reconsider the cozy relationships they have cultivated.
Maybe it is time for legislators not just to be seen negotiating but to actually
negotiate with an eye toward financial commitments that are affordable and
sustainable.
Act 10 was not so much an endorsement of Scott Walker as a furious
rejoinder to the failure of Wisconsin political actors to adequately represent
the interests of the people who elected them. Hostility to agency fees is based
on a sense that public unions have a disproportionately large voice in public
affairs; that they have created and coddled an entrenched and inefficient
workforce,67 and harmed school aged children, especially those from poor

even holding hearings, on President Obama’s middle-of-the-road nomination,
Merrick Garland, for over 100 days at the time of this article’s writing. Though there
has been similar backlash and stalling late in other presidents’ final terms, the
Garland blockade is unprecedented in length and a shining display of the ideological
split the country is facing, as well as the importance of late Justice Scalia’s seat. See
Ed. Bd., The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y. T IMES, June 9, 2016, at A22.
66
See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision making, one must
avoid undue industry influence, or ‘capture.’ Unfortunately, as
Richard Stewart has observed, “[i]t has become widely accepted,
not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics,
legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the
comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in
the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in
favor of these interests.” . . . one can never hope to avoid all hints
of capture. But as with expertise, the question is whether one can
achieve some insulation from interest group pressure.
Id. at 21-24.
67
One example of this is the use of “rubber rooms” where teachers awaiting
disciplinary hearings draw full salary and benefits not to work, but to sit and wait.
See Jennifer Medina, Deal Reached to Fix Teacher Discipline Process, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2010), at A1 (discussing the supposed removal of “rubber rooms” in NYC
and how unions continue impede the disciplinary process by making teachers very
difficult to fire). See generally WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Walden Media 2010)
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and moderate income families who do not enjoy the luxurious option of
private school education.68 One cannot help but ask, if public unions are not
coercing speech, then how to understand the dramatic drop in membership?
Why aren’t employees supporting an organization that is accurately
reflecting its members’ positions on a wide range of issues?
Taxpayers are asking what they have to lose if public sector union
power is dramatically reduced. Wisconsin has answered that question. In
the short run, as salaries are contained or reduced, budget pressure is relieved
and dollars can go to services which might otherwise be cut in times of crisis.
Public sector unions become less politically important and less able to
articulate their views as their staffs shrink. Over the longer term we should
expect to see relief for taxpayers as well from onerous benefits
commitments—especially those for retiree health care, active employee
health care and pensions. As others have suggested, we may see more and
more public employees getting their insurance from a state of federal health
care exchange.69 In the same way the private sector shed many of the
obligations70 we would expect that state and local governments would
(criticizing the American public school system for how it handles disciplining,
reprimanding, and firing tenured teachers).
68
Some advocate for charter schools as a “replacement system for the failed
urban [school] system.” A solution like this would involve “closing low-performing
traditional and charter schools” to only allow schools that are successful educators,
as deemed by the local government or educational authority, to continue operating.
In addition, these advocates suggest allowing failing public school to be taken over
by a charter company if it means the students’ quality of education will increase.
Under their view, urban students are the most needy students, yet their needs are not
close to being met and “well-meaning education reformers” are simply not meeting
these students’ needs properly. See Emma Brown, Can traditional school systems
be replaced by charters?, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/can-traditional-school-systems-bereplaced-by-charters/2013/01/30/e33a013a-6a71-11e2-95b3272d604a10a3_blog.html.
69
See Natalya Shnitser, Accounting and the ACA: New Choices and Challenges
for Public Sector Retiree Health Plans, 20 EM. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 147 (2016).
70
See Susan E. Cancelosi, VEBAS to the Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative
for Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 879, 880-81
(2009).
When private sector employers realized the impact of FAS 106 on
their balance sheets, many chose to terminate retiree health
benefits. Others imposed a variety of cost-containment measures.
Collectively bargained employers, however, generally could not
take such steps. Constrained by their agreements with unions, they

212

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

follow. The private ordering that has dominated everywhere but in the
unionized public sector should creep into the public sector as union power
there declines.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many supporters of pension and health care benefits reform for the
public sector were disappointed by the stalemate produced by Freidrichs
following the death of Justice Scalia. The Court seemed poised to overturn
Abood and usher in a new era of in which fees for contract administration,
grievance adjustment, etc. were forbidden as impermissible interference with
employee free speech rights. Abood has long been justified on anti-free
riding grounds, although no one seriously argued that concerns about free
riding were sufficient to overcome interference with the constitutional rights
of public employees. The recent experience in Wisconsin provides a window
into what a post-Abood world will almost certainly look like. It is an
environment in which public union power is significantly constrained,
had little flexibility in managing their retiree health expenses.
Large, traditional manufacturing companies - with high
concentrations of unionized retirees and historically generous
benefit packages, but shrinking active workforces and negative
economic forecasts - found themselves struggling to remain
financially viable in the face of overwhelming liabilities. The
public sector today faces similar problems. Because GASB 45
demands that government employers acknowledge the true level
of retiree health offers, they risk balance sheet disasters. Most
have financed retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis,
with no assets set aside for future expenses. Many are heavily
unionized, with little room to shift costs to retirees, much less to
terminate benefits. Some have constitutional or statutory
guarantees that protect benefit commitments. Although they do
not risk liquidation the way private sector employers do, financial
insolvency affects state and local governments' ability to raise
money to finance public services and projects. Government
employers, moreover, depend on the good will of taxpayers. They
cannot easily raise taxes or divert funds from other sources.
Meanwhile, the current depressed economy translates to severe
budget problems for state and local governments across the
country. The similarities between the public sector today and the
private sector of the early 1990s raise intriguing questions about
possible solutions for the public sector.
Id. at 880-881.
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membership levels drop and public union political activity decreases. These
changes appear to have made unilateral reductions in the cost of public sector
employee benefits politically feasible resulting in savings to taxpayers. The
Freidrichs decision leaves the problem of forced speech by public employees
unresolved. As states continue to grapple with rapidly escalating benefits
costs in the public sector, one would expect to see another Freidrichs-type
challenge emerge in the not too distant future.
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